We all belong to a community and therefore we all belong to a moral community. Few people will dispute the statement that we all belong to a moral community. Sociopaths and terrorists don’t accept that they are so bound. But ‘most moral theorists’ would deny that such exceptions undermine the moral community. Moral community is a group of beings that shares certain characteristics and whose members are or consider themselves to be bound to observe certain rules of conduct in relation to one another because of their mutual likeness. These rules create what we call obligations and derive in some intimate way from the characteristics which the beings composing the moral community have in common. Moral community can also be referred to a group of people drawn together by a common interest in living according to a particular moral philosophy. Many moral communities are often associated with a religion and advocate that religion's conception of a good life. The congregation of a church, synagogue, or mosque is a typical moral community.
Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some commonly held notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong. Most philosophers suggest only rational beings, who can reason and form self-interested judgments, are capable of being moral agents. Some suggest those with limited rationality (for example, people who are mildly mentally disabled or infants also have some basic moral capabilities).
When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for help. To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to ascribe moral responsibility to them on the basis of what they have done or left undone. (These are examples of other-directed ascriptions of responsibility. The reaction might also be self-directed, e.g., one can recognize oneself to be blameworthy). Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it.
At times, disparate moral communities have conflicting interpretations of what constitutes ethical conduct or an ethical life. Fundamentalist Protestants oppose reproductive rights and same-sex marriage, while many mainline Protestants support the legality of both. In other instances, particular professions or occupations have particular interpretations of situational and professional or occupational moral conduct- for example; many military combatants might kill members of opposing armed forces within a theatre of war. By contrast, many medical organizations oppose the practices of voluntary euthanasia or physician assisted suicide because they believe that it violates their traditional Hippocratic Oath pledge not to intentionally harm another.
The Nazis defended themselves by saying that they were just obeying the laws of their own society and the orders of their military commanders. The prosecution held that every human being is personally morally responsible for his for her actions and that these Nazis should have disobeyed the law and their military commanders. Yet this disobedience would have required immense personal sacrifice (they would probably have been shot for disobeying orders) and would require them to go against their entire society and military training to always obey orders no matter what.
But the question arises now which may give us an endless debate. The moral argument begins with the fact that all people recognize some moral code (that some things are right, and some things are wrong). Every time we argue over right and wrong, we appeal to a higher law that we assume everyone is aware of, holds to, and is not free to arbitrarily change. Suppose a western moral agent come to Nagaland and gave his or her negative judgment on Nagas eating dog meat. What will be our response? One probable response may be, “Who gave you the authority to pass such judgment on us?” Right and wrong imply a higher standard or law, and law requires a lawgiver. Because the Moral Law transcends humanity, this universal law requires a universal lawgiver.
You cannot have a moral law without a moral law-giver. Now one may wonder, why do you actually need a moral law giver if you have a moral law? In order to take the moral law seriously, it must be based on the intrinsic value of persons, which in turn must be based on the value ascribed to person-hood by some particular person. If that person's idea of the value of person-hood is to be considered binding on all people everywhere, rather than simply another of many subjective value judgements, then the person ascribing the value must be intrinsically worthy. They must be a person who is worthy of high value in and of themselves. There is only one real candidate for such a person, that being the Living God.
If you would claim that there is an objective moral law, which transcends all the legal systems of mankind's societies and ought to be obeyed by all people, everywhere, always, then you simply must accept the existence of a personal God. He is Holy, He is Mighty, He is Loving, He is Gracious, and He is Just.
Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some commonly held notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong. Most philosophers suggest only rational beings, who can reason and form self-interested judgments, are capable of being moral agents. Some suggest those with limited rationality (for example, people who are mildly mentally disabled or infants also have some basic moral capabilities).
When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for help. To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to ascribe moral responsibility to them on the basis of what they have done or left undone. (These are examples of other-directed ascriptions of responsibility. The reaction might also be self-directed, e.g., one can recognize oneself to be blameworthy). Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it.
At times, disparate moral communities have conflicting interpretations of what constitutes ethical conduct or an ethical life. Fundamentalist Protestants oppose reproductive rights and same-sex marriage, while many mainline Protestants support the legality of both. In other instances, particular professions or occupations have particular interpretations of situational and professional or occupational moral conduct- for example; many military combatants might kill members of opposing armed forces within a theatre of war. By contrast, many medical organizations oppose the practices of voluntary euthanasia or physician assisted suicide because they believe that it violates their traditional Hippocratic Oath pledge not to intentionally harm another.
The Nazis defended themselves by saying that they were just obeying the laws of their own society and the orders of their military commanders. The prosecution held that every human being is personally morally responsible for his for her actions and that these Nazis should have disobeyed the law and their military commanders. Yet this disobedience would have required immense personal sacrifice (they would probably have been shot for disobeying orders) and would require them to go against their entire society and military training to always obey orders no matter what.
But the question arises now which may give us an endless debate. The moral argument begins with the fact that all people recognize some moral code (that some things are right, and some things are wrong). Every time we argue over right and wrong, we appeal to a higher law that we assume everyone is aware of, holds to, and is not free to arbitrarily change. Suppose a western moral agent come to Nagaland and gave his or her negative judgment on Nagas eating dog meat. What will be our response? One probable response may be, “Who gave you the authority to pass such judgment on us?” Right and wrong imply a higher standard or law, and law requires a lawgiver. Because the Moral Law transcends humanity, this universal law requires a universal lawgiver.
You cannot have a moral law without a moral law-giver. Now one may wonder, why do you actually need a moral law giver if you have a moral law? In order to take the moral law seriously, it must be based on the intrinsic value of persons, which in turn must be based on the value ascribed to person-hood by some particular person. If that person's idea of the value of person-hood is to be considered binding on all people everywhere, rather than simply another of many subjective value judgements, then the person ascribing the value must be intrinsically worthy. They must be a person who is worthy of high value in and of themselves. There is only one real candidate for such a person, that being the Living God.
If you would claim that there is an objective moral law, which transcends all the legal systems of mankind's societies and ought to be obeyed by all people, everywhere, always, then you simply must accept the existence of a personal God. He is Holy, He is Mighty, He is Loving, He is Gracious, and He is Just.
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